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Presenting the case in favor of tax loopholes may seem to be an example
of trying to defend the indefensible.

11

Loophole of course is a perjorative
11

term, indicating some special advantage that a person or group has achieved,
presumably at the expense of the public welfare.

And, as we are told repeat-

edly, eliminating all of the loopholes would permit a massive reduction in
tax rates without any overall decline in revenues.
The implicit trade-off sounds so desirable that we may wonder why the
change has not been made before.

The obvious answer of course quickly comes

to mind : it is the special interests that have prevented it.

Although that

rationale may possess some explanatory value, another approach will be pre sented here, an approach based on a broader view of public policy.

We will

examine the role of these special tax provisions in the light of the tota l ity
of governmental tax, expenditure, and regulatory activities, especially as
these activities affect the relationship of public to private functions in
the United States.
material.

But before doing so, we will cover some preliminary

At this point, it will be helpful to examine the nature of the

loophole arrangements and their impacts on the tax system of which they have
become so basic a part.

Note:

The author is indebted to Robert DeFina for the calculations of tax
expenditures by income class and for other helpful assistance .
Numerous useful comments on an earlier draft were made by Linda
Rockwood.

11
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Technically, the term loophole -- at least in my understanding -- applies
to that entire broad and disparate range of specific provisions in the tax
code which permit one or more taxpayers to depart from the general structure
used for taxing income.
defend every

11

raid

11

To clear the air at the outset, I am not about to

on the Treasury.

That is, I will not be supporting the

desirability of each and every special provision of the Internal Revenue Code
(these remarks will be concentrating on the federal income tax system, although many of the specific points can apply to state and local tax structures).
As a general proposition, I favor the economic notion of horizontal equity"
11

--that is, equal treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances.

And it

should be recognized that a "cleaner" tax code -- one with fewer special pro'

visions -- likely would help to achieve a greater degree of horizontal equity .
Yet, it needs to be acknowledged that there is room for a good degree of
legitimate quibbling as to who are the equals to be treated equally.

The

taxpayer who devotes a portion of his or her income to voluntary contributions
to eelemosynary institutions may quite properly be viewed a bit differently
than the taxpayer with identical income who devotes all of that income to his
or her personal gratifications.

This would seem to be one of the many in-

stances in life where sensible results are more likely to be achieved by
carefully balancing a variety of important considerations, rather than singlemindedly attempting to pursue just one.
At this point, a brief examination of the composition of tax loopholes
may be in order (I will of course try to avoid the obvious distinction that
those special tax provisions which benefit me are essential to the public
welfare, but those that you use are just low-priority loopholes).

As Professor

Boris Bittker explained on this campus on an earlier occasion, there are very
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few tax provisions which meet the formal dictionary definition of "an ambiguity
or omission in a statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention.".!!

In the main, tax loopholes are not the product of an ingenious

attorney or accountant laboriously examining tt1e minutia of the Internal
Revenue Code.

Rather, the typical "loophole was deliberately placed there by
11

the Congress to achieve a public purpose, a purpose of which you or I may
speak good or ill.

Even as enthusiastic a critic of these special tax provi-

sions as Professor Stanley Surrey has been moved to note than many of them
"were expressly adopted to induce actions which the Congress considered in the
nat i on a1 i nteres t . "?J
To belabor the obvious, the charitable deduction was not inserted in the
tax system to provide windfall gains to the wealthy but, in Professor Surrey's
words, "to foster phi 1anthropy.

11

As we are about to see, however, the pro-

viders of that philanthropy constitute a varied lot.
The Nature and

Com~osition

of Tax Expenditures

As it turns out, there is a classification of special tax provisions
which is available for our use.

In recent years, the term "tax expenditures

11

has been developed to describe the cost to the government of what on earlier
occasions had been labeled as loopholes.
scriptive albeit somewhat formidable:

The formal definition is more de -

"revenue losses attributable to provi-

sions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special

~xclusion,

exemption, or

deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential
rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability."
~efore

turning to the data, however, a critique of the tax expenditure

concept is in order.

On its surface, that dreadful phrase may seem to be an
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anomaly.

Either something is a tax or it is an expenditureo

According to

Professor Surrey, who is generally acknowledged to be the father of the tax
expenditure concept, "The term 'tax expenditure' has been used to describe
those special provisions of the federal tax system which represent government
expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and economic
objectives.'''}_/ The notion that the tax incentive device involves the expenditure of government funds is a fundamental error, however, and one that leads
to all sorts of erroneous public policy proposals.
The Surrey view is based on the implicit assumption that the state is entitled to as much individual inGome as it desires.
. .

Hence, the citi.zen's claim

.

on his or her own income is secondary or residual.

Thus, any reduction in

.

that flow of private income to the public Treasury is viewed as an act of
grace by a benevolent sovereign.

To the contrary , a tax expenditure -- if

the concept is to have any justificat-ion -- signifies less taking of private
funds by government.

This is a simple but powerful point.

In my view, tax

expenditures should be seen in the context of the substantial taxes which are
being paid by private individuals and corporations.

To tell a person who is

paying out over a third of his or her income in federal taxes that he or she
is unduly benefitting from some tax expenditure reflects a strange view of
tax equity.

And to be told that by a beneficiary of the low income allowance

compounds the insult.
Tax incentives are a device designed
to alter private behavior in an
'
.

economy already strongly influenced by government; they are intended specifically to increase private expenG!iture on a particular item or

catego~y.

From

a purely fiscal viewpoint, a dollar less paid in taxes has the same effect
on the budget position as a dol·l a r more d.i;sburs;ed

by

government.

But-, a
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variety of different consequences may flow from choosing the tax or the expenditure route for achieving public purposes.
An important shortcoming of the tax expenditure concept arises from the
method used in estimating the dollar magnitudes.

The data reported do not

take account of any of the indirect effects from the operation of each of
these special tax provisions.~ Many of the tax expenditures alter taxpayer
behavior and economic conditions; their elimination also might require offsetting changes in federal expenditure programs or in other aspects of the
tax system in order to avoid obviously undesirable effects -- but thus prevent
the Treasury from recapturing the full revenue loss.

The tax exemption of

interest received on state and local bonds is an interesting case in point •
.

On the surface, this provision appears merely to provide tax relief to the
holders of these securities.

And numerous tax reformers urge the prompt

elimination of that "loophole" on that basis.

But, on reflection, the tax

exemption enables the states and localities to issue bonds at lower interest
rates than other borrowers of comparable risk categories.

(Certainly, the

purchasers of these securities would turn to higher yield issues if the interest were to become taxable.)
Thus, some of the tax expenditure also implicitly involves a substantial
subsidy to the governmental units issuing these securities.

In fact, the

more sophisticated tax reform proposals designed to eliminate or reduce the
use of the tax-exempt securities i nvo 1ve the payment of federa 1 subsidies .t o
state and local governments to offset the higher interest payments that they
would have to make in order to
. sell their securities in the "taxable market."
.

.

.

Depending on the subsidy level, there could be a net l.oss or a net gain to
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the Treasury from the combination of closing the tax-exemption loophole and
simultaneously enabling state and local governments to continue selling bonds
at low interest costs.~
Despite these and other shortcomings, the available data on so-called
tax

~xpenditures

are useful in making some rough approximations of the distri-

bution of the beneficiaries of tax ••loopholes.

11

The results may well come as

a surprise to many of the enthusiastic but less critical supporters of the
But, then again, one is reminded of the hoary governmental wise-

concept.
crack,

11

If you want it bad, you get it bad. 11

Some of the tax expenditures are well known and have become notorious.
11

11

A few ready examples are depletion allowances, the tax exemption of the in•

terest on state and local bonds, and those provisions which have been used to
shelter certain types of income (such as expensing of interest and taxes paid
during the construction of buildings).

However, it may come as a surprise to

many that these items comprise a relatively small portion of the $95.3 billion of tax expenditures reported by the Treasury Department in the fiscal
year 1976.§1 The great bulk of the $95.3 billion, rather, consists of items
which I suspect the vast majority of the public never thinks of as a loophole.
Among the largest tax expenditures, for example, are the deductibility
of mortgage interest and property taxes on owner-occupied residences.

The

tax treatment of these two items of personal expenses of the typical homeowner account for a total of $8.9 billion of revenue foregone in the fiscal
year 1976.

Other significant special provisions include deducting charitable

contributions ($5.4 billion of revenue loss to the Treasury), excluding from
.

taxation employer and self-employed contributions to employee pensions ($8.4
billion) and medical insurance premiums and medical care programs for

- 7employees ($4.5 billion), excluding from taxation social security and unemployment benefits ($7.0 billion), and deducting personal state and local taxes,
other than on homes ($8.0 billion) .
However, merely reciting specific examples such as these may give a distorted picture of the total reality.

Tables 1 and 2, therefore, are an

attempt to show the overall distribution of tax expenditures by income class.
The data on tax expenditures are taken from the official tabulation in the
The assignment of tax expenditure benefit to income

annual federal budget.

classes is based on a Treasury Department study for 1971 prepared for the
Joint Economic Committee.ZI
The amounts shown in the category "lower income groups 11 are based on the
•

proportion of each tax expenditure in 1971 received
justed gross income of $10,000 or less.

by

those taxpayers with ad-

The data for the middle income groups ..
11

are based on the proportion of each tax expenditure in the base year going to
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 to $50,000.

Frankly, I would

have preferred using a lower top limit for the middle grouping but the Treasury
did not split up the category, $20,000 to $50,000.

Nevertheless, the bulk of

the tax expenditures (56 percent in 1971) were received by the bottom half of
the middle group, those reporting adjusted gross incomes of $10,000 to $20,000.
The "upper income groups

11

in these tables consist of taxpayers with adjusted

gross incomes of $50,000 and over.
.

No attempt is made here to trace through the incidence of the tax expenditures received by corporations, although I would expect that some substantial portion of the ultimate benefit is received by lower-income and
middle-income groups.
viewpoints.

The public finance literature provides a variety of

Personally, I subscribe to a mixed case, where some of the bene-

fits are shifted forward to consumers in the form of lower prices, some are
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shifted backward to employees in the form of higher incomes and fringe benefits , and some significant amount benefits the shareholders .

Examples of

probab l e backward shifting, although relatively small, may be the most apparent.

I have in mind here the tax credit for employing welfare recipients

and the increase in the investment credit for the companies that use t he
proceeds to finance employee stock ownership plans .
As shown in Table 1, the bulk of all the estimated tax expenditures are
received by lower and middle income taxpayers -- $56.5 billion out of $95.3
billion in 1976 or 59 percent of the total.

By and large the major recipients

of the tax expenditure benefits received by personal (as contrasted to
corporate) taxpayers are those i n the middle-class category-- $38 .6 billion
compared to $17.9 billion for the lower-income category and $15.9 billion for
the upper-income category.
Several large tax expenditures benefit primari l y lower-income taxpayers.
This i s the case with the tax exemption of various government benefit payments which are received primarily by low income people who would otherwise
have to pay taxes on such income.

Examples i nclude excluding veterans dis-

ability compensation payments ($595 million of revenue foregone), excluding
social security benefits ($2.7 billion), and excluding unemployment benefits
($3.3 billion).
To be sure, several important types of tax expenditures tend to benefit
primarily corporations and investors and other relatively high - bracket income
earners.

Examples in this category include the special tax treatment of

capital ga in s ($7.9 billion), the investment credit ($9.5 billion), t he ex.

elusi on of interest on state and local debt ($4. 8 billion), and the excess
of percentage over cost depletion (·$1.3 billion).

Clearly, the $95.3 billion
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Table 1

SUMMARY OF TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976
(dollars i n bil lions)
Amount
Estimated benefits to lower
income groups

$17.9

Percent of Total

19

Estimated benefits to middle
income groups

38.6

40

Estimated benefits to upper
•
1ncome
groups

15.9

17

Estimated benefits to
corporations

22.9

24

95.3

100

Total
Source:

Table 2.

•
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of tax expenditures in the fiscal year 1976 cannot be characterized as merely
an array of depletion allowances and other very specialized or esoteric tax
•

•

prov1s1ons.
Table 2 (presented at the end of this paper) shows the great variety of
the specific tax expenditures for which the Treasury Department publishes
estimated dollar magnitudes .
Justifications for Tax Incentives
The basic justifications that have been put forward for the various
special tax provisions are extensive and have varied over time, even for individual items.

Typical national objectives cited by the proponents have

ranged from fostering emp l. oyment and economic growth to enhancing equity to
supporting worthy private institutions and state and local governments.

The

specific weight given to any of these objectives is, of course, a rather
subjective matter.
The special treatment of the major tax expenditures received by upperincome taxpayers and corporations -- capital gains, the investment credit,
and similar items -- is justified by the need to promote investment and hence
achieve a growing economy which will provide both more employment and a rising
standard of living.

We need to recall also that the special tax treatment of

capital gains was instituted prior to the insertion of the income-averaging
concept into the Internal Revenue Code.

In that earlier period, were capital

gains to have been taxed at ordinary income rates, many taxpayers would have
..

been paying taxes on long-term gains far higher than the brackets that would
correspond to their income levels during the period in which those gains were

.

•

- 11 accruing (that is the bunching phenomenon ).
11

11

I assume, however, that income

averaging would be extended to capital gains should these gains become taxable at regular rates.

Thus, the primary justification for differential

capital gains treatment can now be viewed in different terms -- providing desired inducements to investment.

We should be aware of the obvious:

to the

extent that the private sector is unable to raise the funds to finance
economic growth, pressure rises for greater governmental involvement in business affairs .
Surely, in recent years, the federal government has become an important
competitor for investment funds.

The Treasury•s financing of budget deficits

plus a growing array of federally-owned or federally-sponsored credit agencies
'

have obtained one-third or more of the total funds flowing through the nation's
capital markets.~ Viewed from this prospective, the various tax expenditures
devoted to encouraging private investment may merely offset the deleterious
effects of the government's expenditure and borrowing activities.
The deductibility of state and local taxes furthers the objective of
strengthening the other levels of government through the federal government•s
sharing the burden of the taxes levied by these jurisdictions.

This can be

viewed as an early "revenue sharing effort in the federal system.
11

Moreover,

in the absence of this deduction or a provis·ion with similar effect, the
combination of federal, state, and local income taxes for some taxpayers could
.

result in a total rate close to 100 percent of income, thus bordering on sheer
confiscation.

When the top bracket of the federal income tax was 93 percent,

this was a very real possibility.
Numerous reasons are cited for the tax deductibility of charitable contributions.

The voluntary, private institutions thus supported provide

- 12 diversity and free choice.

They can experiment and enter fields too contro-

versial for government agencies.

They often take on responsibilities which

otherwise would be financed entirely by tax revenues.~
The deductibility of interest paid by individuals (that is, interest on
personal as opposed to business indebtedness) is a more complicated matter.
The largest portion is interest on mortgages on owner-occupied homes.

The

deterioration of many central cities in recent years has strengthened the
justification of enhancing family and neighborhood stability by encouraging
individual home ownership.

The deductibility of interest on general consumer

debt may be more difficult to defend.

Personally, I find it hard to see why

the general taxpayer should subsidize the families that wish to go into debt
to buy new refrigerators or second cars.

In contrast, the interest that in-

dividuals receive on their savings is of course fully taxable.

Perhaps, un-

intentionally, this provision also illustrates the tendency of the tax system
to tilt in favor of consumption rather than saving.
Some personal deductions are really reasonable refinements of gross income in order to obtain a fair and equitable concept of a taxable income base.
Cases in point are the deductions of expenses related to earning income, such
as union dues, child care for working wives, work clothing, and fees on safe
deposit boxes for securities.

A few corporate tax exemptions -- notably the

exemption of credit unions and some of the income of cooperatives -- are an
aid to those non-profit institutions organized in the corporate form.
As in each of the other cases cited here, no attempt is made at this
point in the argument to assess the adequacy of these justifications, but
.

merely to emphasize that there is another side to the traditional tax reform
arguments .

Although most popular discussions of tax reform tend to ignore
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the substantive purposes of many of these special tax provisions, the underly. ing literature of public finance does not.

In the most definitive study of

personal tax deductions, for example, Professor C. Harry Kahn states that
these tax provisions are designed to "differentiate between taxpayers whose
incomes, though apparently equal, are of different sizes in some relevant
101
sense."
Thus, without prejudging their effectiveness, we should note that at
least some special tax provisions (perhaps the additional exemption for the
blind or the deduction of casualty losses) are intended to further the achievement of horizontal equity (equal treatment of equals).

Professor Kahn goes

on to state that "care must be taken not to designate the tax equivalents [the
revenue foregone from pers6nal

d~ductions]

as simple tax losses .

If intend-

ed to spur private expenditures , for instance, in the philanthropic domain,
the figures represent more accurately the tax post to the government of encouraging expenditures which might otherwise have to be undertaken by government."ll/
Shortcomings of the

T~x

.

lhcehtive
Approach
.

Surely the Internal Revenue Code contains numerous "marginal" subsidies,
where a modest tax benefit enables the private sector to continue some worthy
· undertaking (hospitals or orphanages, for example) at a fraction of the cost
which the federal Treasury would have to bear should the activity be run by
the state. · But, there are tax "she·l ters 11 in the CoEie · which provide an inordinate amount of benefit to the recipients or cost to the Treasury, far out
of proportion to their value to society as a whole.

- 14 Special tax provisions (tax expenditures) have been criticized on numerous
grounds.

Many of them, especially the deductions from income, are attacked as

being regressive, because they reduce the tax burdens of upper income taxpayers more than those of lower income taxpayers.
that effect.

Deductions clearly do have

Under the deduction approach, the amount of tax saving per dol-

lar of deductible expenditure depends on the marginal tax bracket of the taxpayer.

Thus, an upper income taxpayer receives a larger tax reduction than

does a lower income taxpayer for making the same dollar amount of charitable
contribution or payment of state and local taxes .
In effect, the government subsidizes the taxpayer to the extent of 14
percent of the state and local taxes and charitable contributions for the
individual or family in

th~

lowest tax bracket (when they itemize rather than

take the standard deduction).

In the case of those in the top bracket, the

government subsidizes 70 percent of those expenditures, and somewhere in between for the others.

The many taxpayers using the standard deductions re12
ceive no tax benefits from their contr.i buti ens. 1
From the viewpoint of achieving desired public policy objectives, special
tax provisions lack some of the compelling characteristics of direct expenditures.

The typical (but not all) direct expenditure programs offer the

following advantages:

the public has a clearer picture of the flow of federal

assistance; the Congress can exercise annual control over the size and distribution of the benefits; the financial aid given to private individuals and
groups can be weighed against the desirability of government agencies taking
direct responsibility for the programs in question.

This idyllic view, how-

ever, ·i s not readily reconciliable with the reality of trends in the federal

- 15 budget.

In recent years, the relatively

11

Uncontrollable expenditure programs
11

(social security pensions, interest on the public debt, unemployment compensation, etc.) have come to dominate total federal spending.

In fact, many of

these programs do not even appear in the annual appropriation bills but are
13
funded via so-called permanent and indefinite appropriations. 1
Prospects for Change
As pointed out earlier in this paper, this is not a plea for the retention of every special provision in the tax system.

To an economist, it is

reasonable to contrast the costs and benefits of various mechanisms for
achieving public policy objectives.

It certainly is conceivable that, in

some cases, direct expenditures may be a more desirable alternative than tax
'

incentives.

In other cases, credit assistance or regulatory programs or still

other approaches may be preferred.

There seems to be little need to take a
.

doctrinaire attitude and prohibit public policy from using any one of these
alternatives.

.

Rather, the advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism

should be weighed and the most desirable one used to achieve a specific objective, be it the encouragement of business investment or the discouragement
of environmental pollution.
On reflection, the implications of moving from indirect support through
•

the tax system to direct federal expenditure subsidies are profound, especially in the many instances of aid to private and state-local institutions.
Taken literally (as has been suggested by some tax reformers), this move would
mean putting private hospitals, orphanages, schools, and similar social
141
service and charitable institutions into the federal budget.
The opportuni. ties for federal influence and control over the conduct of these private

'

- 16 organizations would be obvious and could be very considerable.
Moreover, the constitutional separation of church and state would probably prevent extending such direct general-purpose financial support to churchrelated medical and educational facilities and certainly to the religious
institutions themselves.

The choice between tax incentives and direct federal

expenditures turns out to involve more than the selection among technical
financing mechanisms.

The choice involves altering the balance between public

and private power in our society.

Although the issue is rarely if ever so

clearly joined, that may explain why the debate gets so heated at times.
However, the use of the tax incentive route does not require adhering
to the specific types of tax mechanisms now in use.

For example, the deduc-

tion from taxable income is not the only way in which the tax system can be
used to encourage taxpayers to spend some of their money in a manner which
accords with national interests.
status quo.

It is merely an example of the power of the

Deductions have been part of the system since the institution

of the income tax law in 1913.
An alternative to the deduction is already available and has been used
in various specific instances -- the tax credit, which is a deduction from
the ultimate tax liability rather than from taxable income.

Although the

distinction between credits and deductions may be considered to be a technical matter only of interest to specialists, the differences in effects may
be very significant for the individual taxpayer.

.

Given the progressive na-

ture of the personal income tax structure, ordinary deductions are implicitly
regressive .

Credits can be more flexible.

A credit can be given in terms

.

of a percentage of an expenditure, and various ceilings may be put on the
amount of the credit.

Moreover, credits can be used by that vast portion of
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~

low and moderate income taxpayers that do not itemize individual contributions,
but use the standard deduction.
The credit concept is in widespread use in the corporate tax structure,
where its use ranges from encouraging the employment of welfare recipients
to expanding business plant and equipment.

In the individual tax system,

credits are now provided for child and dependent care expenses, retirement income, and political contributions (sometimes as a voluntary alternative to
the deductions).

Suggestions to use tax credits in place of personal exemptions

(the present $750 deduction for each taxpayer and dependent) have been made by
President Carter and Vice President Mondale, among others.
As pointed out earlier, the value of a deductible dollar varies with the
taxpayer's
bracket.
.

.

With a fixed percentage credit, in contrast, a given

dollar of charitable outlays, for example, wouid generate the same amount of
tax saving, regardless of the taxpayer's income level.

Of course, the upper

bracket taxpayers might make a larger donation and thus qualify for a larger
absolute tax benefit, but they would receive the same proportional benefit.
Depending on the percentage credit, such a system would reenforce the progressivity of the personal income tax, since those whose marginal rates were
below the percentage credit would have their average bill reduced.

Those in

the higher brackets would find their tax bills raised in the process .
The mechanism of a tax credit could be important in strengthening the
.

role of voluntary organizations in our national life by making them more
democratic.

Because the proposed tax credit would operate to the advantage

of lower and moderate income taxpayers, it could help to create a potential
.

new constituency for private institutions, freeing many of them from their
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present dependence on the wealthy few.

Unlike the alternative of direct sup-

port through government expenditures, substituting tax credits for personal
deductions would constitute a modest step toward decentralizing decisionmaking in our society and encouraging diversity in the way that social objectives are achieved.
One would wish to cite a less shopworn metaphor, but the typical tax reformer tends to concentrate on the hole rather than on the doughnut.

Unfor-

tunately, the existing situation seems to be a fine example of the Lord (or
the Feds, rather) giveth and the Feds taketh away.

Private institutions in

the United States of course were alive, well, and growing prior to their support through the income tax system.

No doubt the powerful combination of

.

heavy taxation and the expansion of public philanthropy and functions has
adversely affected both the ability and the incentive of private citizens to
support private undertakings and has led to the need for offsetting aid via
the tax incentive route.
As has been amply demonstrated in another connection, a major long-term
barrier to private sector saving and investment is the large governmental
budget deficits whose financing is competitive with private undertakings.

If

the public sector were smaller and its intrusion into the private sector substantially reduced, there might be little need to advocate supporting private
institutions via the tax system.

To be sure, some private interests -- be
.

they business, labor, agriculture, or any other --will always try to enrich
themselves at the expense of the public welfare.

But that knowledge should

not cause us to overlook the fundamentally adverse impacts of government action on the private sector.
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Perhaps we have come full circle.

The aims of the conventional tax re-

formers and the objectives of the apparent defenders of the status quo may
not be as far apart as they initially appear to be.

The reconciliation of

the two sets of objectives may lie in the more widespread understanding of
the conditions that led to the adoption of so many of the special tax provisions in the first place.

The simple elimination of these tax provisions

often would leave unfulfilled the objectives that they are designed to foster.
Yet a more effective approach to public policy might be in dealing with the
basic conditions that often prevent private institutions, business and nonprofit alike, from performing their intended functions, conditions that
frequently -- and on occasion unwittingly -- result from the rapid expansion
of governmental activities.

Dealing with those basic conditions would have

the added advantage of avoiding the revenue losses and the equity problems
that may result from using tax incentives.
One example, among many, may help to particularize this general notion.
As many studies have demonstrated, the compulsory minimum wage law tends to
price low- skilled and low-educated workers, especially teenagers, out of the
labor market.

To some extent, this adverse effect is offset by tax credits

which are intended to encourage employers to give jobs to this target population.

I am confident that employment would rise, the budget deficit reduced,

and the general welfare enhanced if both programs were eliminated simultaneous.

ly.

But to eliminate the tax expenditure while ignoring the underlying

problem, as seems to be the traditional approach to tax reform, is another
exercise in futility.
Similarly, the need for tax incentives to encourage private support of
educational institutions arises in so large a part from the adverse effects
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of other governmental actions.

The rapid expansion of classrooms and educa-

tional buildings in public institutions has frequently resulted in much of
the higher educational system operating far below capacity, and thus pushing
up unit costs (more generous scholarships directly paid to students would
have been a far more efficient approach).

These upward cost pressures are in

addition to the basic inflation engendered by federal fiscal and monetary
policy.
A similar situation arises in the health field.

The overly rapid expan-

sion of hospitals has resulted in an empty bed problem with attendant upward
pressures on unit costs.

And here the inflation in health care costs result-

ing from the government's medicare and medicaid programs has exacerbated the
financial squeeze facing private health care institutions.
It is cavalier, to say the least, for the naive tax reformers to blithely
ignore all of the adverse impacts of government action on private institutions
and then pick on one of the few areas of public policy -- tax expenditures -where the public sector attempts to undo the damage.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to show that a sympathetic examination of .. loopholes" or tax expenditures, to use the more technical and quantifiable term,
can be useful.

The mechanism of tax expenditures (or incentives) may serve

a variety of public purposes, ranging from promoting. business investment and
economic growth to encouraging private, voluntary organizations.
Indeed, the growth of tax expenditures may be viewed as a reaction to
the severe impacts that the expansion of government power and activities has
had on the viability of private sector institutions.

But the prompt elimina-

tion of those obstacles (such as large deficit financing and pervasive
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government regulation) seems to be an unrealistic expectation.

Hence, the

reliance on second-best alternatives, such as tax expenditures, may on occasian be a sensible route.
The survey of the specific tax expenditures which is undertaken in this
paper reveals that, in the main, they are not special benefits to the highest
income classes nor the product of ingenious accountants or attorneys.

Rather,

the typical tax expenditure benefits primarily middle and lower income groups
of the population.

Nor are the major tax expenditures obtained by engaging

in unusual activities.

Rather, they are received from such prosaic activities

as paying ·state and local taxes, owning a home, and working for a company that
provides group insurance and similar fringe benefits .
.

To be sure, not all tax expenditures are of this nature -- and not each
one · needs to be defended.

But the point being made here is that neither

should the entire category be condemned and its elimination urged as an unequivocal matter of equity.
As pointed out in this paper, there are reforms which could be instituted
-- such as the more widespread use of the tax credit device -- to simultaneously help to achieve greater progressivity in the tax structure and still serve
to attain the basic purposes intended by the Congress.
Given the current interest in tax reform, it seems evident that proposed
changes should be viewed in a broader context than in the past.

Questions of

.

income distribution and macroeconomic policy have tended to dominate the discussion of tax policy.

But we must also address such other important aspects

as the effects on the respective roles of the public and private sectors and
of federal, state, and local governments and the resultant shifts in the
distribution of power in the society.
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All in all, tax incentives may, in this imperfect world, often be the
most realistic available alternative to achieving such important objectives
as enhancing economic growth and employment, strengthening state and local
governments, and encouraging a diversity of private, voluntary approaches to
meeting society's needs.
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Table 2

ESTIMATED TAX EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEAR 1976
(in millions of dollars )

Benefit To Income Group
Lower · Middle Upper · CorpoIncome
Income
Income rati ons

Item of Tax Expenditure
,..

.

I

I

I

•

I

Total

Benefit Primarily to Lower Income Group
Exclusion of benefits and allowances to
armed forces personnel

765

245

10

--

1,020

Disability insurance benefits

277

46

7

--

330

2,153

49 1

81

--

2,725

14

6

--

--

20

101

90

4

195

1,968

1,334

33

3,335

95

--

--

----

Deduction and credit for child and
dependent care expenses

241

49

--

--

290

Exclusion of scholarships and fellowships

144

51

--

--

195

Exclusion of veterans disability
compensation

309

280

6

--

595

Excess of percent standard deduction .
·over 1ow income a11 owance

855

274

11

--

1, 140

Earned income credit

165

53

2

--

220

7, 087

2, 919

154

--

10,160

22

48

20

90

Exclusion of veterans pensions

7

16

7

---

Exclusion of G.I. Bill benefits

73

162

70

--

305

Exclusion of social security benefits
Additional exemption for the blind
Exclusion of sick pay

•

Exclusion of unemployment benefits
Exclusion of public assistance benefits

Subtotal

95

Benefit Primarily to Middle Income Group
.
'

.

Exclusion of military disability pensions
.

30
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Table 2 (continued)
Item of Tax Expenditure
¥

•

I

j

I

•

i

Lower
Income

Be_!1efi t . To Income Group. · · ·
Middle Upper
CorpoIncome Income
rations Total

275

607

26 3

--

1,145

Retirement income credit and credit
for the elderly

26

58

26

--

110

Exclusion of capital gain on home if
over 65

10

21

9

--

40

Exclusion of railroad retirement system
benefits

46

101

43

190

Benefits for dependents and survivors

155

342

148

--...

645

Exclusion of special benefits for disabled coal miners

12

27

11

--

50

Exclusion of income earned abroad by
U.S. citizens

32

110

3

--

Expensing of certain capital outlays by
farmers

159

241

55

85

540

Capital gains treatment of certain income of farmers

110

167

38

10

325

90

288

52

--

430

Deduction of interest on consumer credit

316

1, 684

105

--

2,105

Deduction of mortgage interest on
residenc::es

779

3,799

292

--

4, 870

Deduction of property taxes on
residences

564

2, 902

564

--

4, 030

49

194

162

100

505

3

15

7

15

40

283

295

12

--

590

1,980

5, 383

987

--

8, 350

Additional exemption for over 65

'

Dividend exclusion

Depreciation on rental housing in excess
of straight lin~
Housing rehabilitation
Exclusion of .workers' compensation benefits
Exclusion of pension contributions and
•
earn1ngs

.

145
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Table 2 (continued)
Item of Tax Expenditure
4

•

I

f

•

Exclusion of employer-paid premiums
on accident and life insurance

Benefit To Income Gr9up
Lower
Middle Upper
CorpoIncome Income Income rations

Total

217

556

57

--

830

1,212

3,008

270

--

4,490

133

164

13

--

310

4

6

--

--

10

Exclusion of interest on life insurance
•
sav1ngs

215

1,225

215

--

1,655

Deduction of charitable contributions

531

2,496

1,843

540

5,410

Deduction of medical expenses

764

1,389

162

--

2,315

Deduction of casualty losses

84

167

59

--

310

Parental personal exemptions for
students, age 19 and over

209

418

93

--

720

Deduction of non-business state and
1oca 1 taxes

823

4,584

2,558

--

7,965

8

19

8

35

Deferral of capital gain on home sale

135

659

51

Credit for purchase of new home

104

507

39

Deferral of interest on savings bonds

132

292

126

-----

29

94

17

40

180

145

321

139

--

605

9,736

32,365

8,524

790

51,415

439

1,830

5,051

545

7,865

2

10

28

15

55

441

1,840

5,079

560

7,920

Exclusion of employer-paid medical
insurance premiums and medical care
Exclusion of employer provided meals
and lodging
Exclusion of income of trusts to finance
supplementary unemployment benefits

Credit and deduction for political contributions

Excess first year depreciation
Maximum tax on earned income
Subtotal

845
650
550

Benefit Primarily to Upper Income Group
Capital gains
Capital gains treatment of royalties on
coal and iron ore
Subtotal
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Table 2 (continued)
I tern of Tax ,Exeendi tur_e
Lower
Income
Benefit Prima.rily .to Corppratio,ns,

Benefit To Income Group
Middle Upper
CorpoIncome
Income rations

Total

'

Investment credit

507

923

380

7,685

9,495

Credit for employing AFDC and public
assistance recipients

--

--

--

10

10

Depreciation on buildings (other than
housing) in excess of straight line

24

96

80

225

425

Employee stock ownership plans financed
through investment credit

--

--

25

25

Exemption of credit unions

--

--

---

145

145

-33

-104

-18

410

255

Corporate surtax exemption

--

--

--

4,170

4,170

Capital gains treatment of certain
timber income

11

28

56

290

385

Expensing of exploration and development
costs

14

59

87

640

800

Excess of percentage over cost depletion

23

105

157

1,010

1,295

Exclusion of interest on state and local
debt

17

263

1,365

3,115

4,760

5

17

3

1,325

1,350

Expensing of construction period interest
and taxes

52

114

49

415

630

Exclusion of gross-up on dividends of
LDC corporations

--

--

--

40

40

Deferral of income of Domestic International Sales Corporations

--

--

--

1,220

1,220

--

--

--

50

50

Exclusion of certain income of ·
cooperatives

Expensing of research and development

.

Special tax rate for western hemisphere
trade corporations
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Table 2 (continued)
Item of Tax Expenditure
0

Lower
Income

Benef it To Income Group
Middle Upper
CorpoIncome Income rations

Total

Deferral of tax on shipping companies

--

--

--

110

110

Railroad rolling stock five year
amortization

--

--

--

-25

-25

Excess bad debt reserve of financial
institutions

--

--

--

485

485

Credit for corporations in U.S .
•
possess1ons

--

--

--

240 .

240

620

1, 501

2,159

21,585

25, 865

17,884

38,625

15,916

22,935

95,360

Subtotal
Total

Source:

Data in total column and for corporations taken from Special Analyses,
Budget of the Unit~d States Government, Fiscal Year 1978. For explanation of breakdown by income class see appendix to this paper .

.-

- 28 Footnotes
)j Boris I. Bittker, "Income Tax 'Loopholes' And Political Rhetoric," Michigan

Law Review, May 1973, p. 1102.

Y

Stanley S. Surrey, 11 Tax Incentives As a Device for Implementing Government
Policy, Harvard Law Review, February 1970, p. 711.
11

3/
Ibid.,
p.
706.
~ See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform:
The Concept of Tax Expenditures, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973, appendix to chapter 1.
5/
See
David
J.
Ott
and
Attiat
F.
Ott,
"The
Tax
Subsidy
Through
Exemption
of
- State and Local Bond Interest, " in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs, Part 3, Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1972; Frank E. Morris, 11 Tax Exemption for State and Local
Bonds, 11 George Washington Law Review, March 1974, pp. 526 - 536.
0

§! "Tax ExpenditureS, Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1978, Washington, Government Printing .Qff.i-Ge, 1977, pp. 119-142.
11

7/ Statement of Honorable Edwin S. Cohen, Under Secretary of the Treasury be-

fore the Joint Economic ' Committee, Ju ly 21, 1972.
8/
Murray
L.
Weidenbaum,
Business,
Government,
and
the
Public,
Englewood
Cliffs,
-

Prentice-Hall, 1977, p. 138.

9/
See
Giving
in
America,
Report
of
the
Commission
on
Private
Philanthropy
and
- Pub 1i c Needs, 1975. ·

10/ C. Harry Kahn, Personal Deductions in the Federp.l Income Tax, Princeton,
Princeton Univers·ity 'Press, 1960, p. 174.
11/ Ibid., p. 178.

.·

12/ See Murray L. Weidenbaum, "The Advantages of Credits on the Persona l Income
Tax, George Washington Law Review, March 1974, pp. 516-525.
11

13/ Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Institutional Obstacles to Reallocating Government
ExpenditureS, in Robert Haveman and Julius Margolis, editors, Public
Expenditures and Po 1 icy Ana 1ys is, Chicago, Ma.rkham Pub 1i ~~~ i ng Co. , 1970,
pp. 232-245.
11

14/ Paul R. McDan iel, "Federal Match in g Grants for Charitable Contributions: A
Substitute for the Income Tax Deductions," Tax Law Review, 1972, pp. 409411.

